

## KATZ UND MAUS IM SANDKASTEN


Lukas Rist Sr. Software Engineer MA Andre Engel Sr. System Engineer ATP DACH & EE

### **SYMANTEC** AT A GLANCE



#### SYMANTEC WE FIGHT FOR THE USER







INTELLIGENCE

SOURCED

FROM:

**1 Billion** previously unseen web requests scanned daily



**2 Billion** emails scanned per day



**175M** Consumer and Enterprise endpoints protected

9 global threat response centers with


**3,000** Researchers and Engineers



Increasing inflow from Families known to use SSL\* Malware based on **SSL Blacklist**<sup>†</sup> families spiked dramatically towards the end of 2015!

Dridex	Spambot	Tinba
KINS	Retefe	Gozi
Shylock	TeslaCrypt	VMZeus
URLzone	CryptoLocker	Redyms
TorrentLocker	Bebloh	Qadars
CryptoWall	Gootkit	Vawtrack
Upatre	Geodo	Emotet

New Samples of Families Known to Use SSL (2014 - 2016)



klist can be viewed at https://sslbl.abuse.ch

#### **100% OF ALL SECURITY SOLUTIONS HAVE WEAKNESSES**

Protect Like an Onion Network Protection Antivirus Sandbox

Weaknesses Encryption Packers/Polymorphic VM Detection

Make It Hard Make 'em sweat those tears...

#### HIDING FROM THE CAT NETWORK TRAFFIC

Remember good ol' IRC Let's hide in HTTP How about Twitter? P2P? Blending into encrypted Traffic

#### HIDING FROM THE CAT NETWORK TRAFFIC

# TΜ IRC HTTP

op 10 Counries			top	10 new counrie	s toda	(	100	10 Countries or	Her by DOL S PE	ports
Country	Ratin 11092		-	Country Germany	Rat 110	ing 64%	-	Country Spain	Rating 3638710	83%
Germany	3197	19%	1	Spain	16	9%		Mexico	200657	5%
Italy	708	4%		Italy	15	9%		Argentina	172598	4%
Argentina	484	3%		United States	9	5%		Germany	94016	2%
Mexico	446	3%	Ser.5	Unknown	7	4%		United States	50333	1%
United	263	2%	-	Poland	4	2%		Peru	36990	1%
States	0.0	4.07	*	Portugal	4	2%		Venezuela	36606	1%
Peru	96	196	=	Netherlands	2	1%	-	Unknown	32458	1%
Venezuela	94	1%	-	Colombia	1	1%		Italy	27914	156
Colombia	91	1%	-	United	3	1%		Colombia	27894	1%
Totally: 65	67	0%		Kingdom totaly: 173			1.000	Totally bot's n		
				2.7.67 2.8.88 2.9.94 3.2.86 3.3.95 3.0.92	922 916 841 691 683 615	5% 5% 4% 4%				
Bot's count:17	113	AENe	w.bo	3.0.90 Totally: 67 Sur bots:201 today:173 ve bot's: 19%		y Bot		ts:3334	bot has: 106	

HTTP/S

#### HIDING FROM THE CAT ENDPOINT SECURITY

Tejon Crypter: 75\$ for AV evasion? Rootkit TDL3: File infector, load during boot, intercept file operations, replace overwritten boot sector with original data. Luckily they left a pointer behind...

#### HIDING FROM THE CAT SANDBOXING

Sandboxes are more than just run-time analysis:

- File, IP, domain reputation
- File properties
- Statistical analysis
- Detonation

→ Small anti-virus lab on premise

Pattern	Matching Results
aŭs 10	Malware beaconing detected
aŭs 10	File reputation: Malware (10)
aŭs 10	Creates malicious events: Xpaj [Fileinfector]
jaŭi≰ 9	Modifies the boot sector
6	Packer: PECompact
5	PE: Contains compressed section
5	Resource section contains an executable
4	Checks whether debugger is present
3	HTTP connection - response code 200 (success
3	Connects to a search engine site
2	PE: Nonstandard section
2	.NET compiled executable

#### Pattern Matching Results Malware beaconing detected Deletes shadow copies [Ransomware] Modifies registry autorun entries Starts WMI command-line (WMIC) utility File reputation: Suspicious.E PE: Contains compressed section 5 Adds autostart object Terminates process under Windows subfolder Sleeps skipped Long sleep detected PE: Nonstandard section

Sandboxes show the behavior as on a real system See the installation of a bootkit before it is on real system See ransomware before it encrypts files on a user's system

#### Anna is anon

#### HIDING FROM THE CAT SANDBOXING

Detecting discrepancies in the execution environment


Typically look for signs of being run in a sandbox, or any differences in the execution environment compared to what is expected on the target


#### Anna le anna


#### HIDING FROM THE CAT SANDBOXING

## Exhibit different behavior inside the sandbox than on a target system

# Often means not running the 'malicious part' of the code, or simply crash







### PROCESSING MALWARE TO THE CLOUD!

Reduce maintenance and development cost (fewer systems by providing a common platform)

Enable analysts to do efficient threat hunting and MA pattern/signature development

#### PROCESSING MALWARE TO THE CLOUD!

Analyze large amounts of samples with different tools Optimize the selection of samples to be analyzed in MA Allow for easy deployment of additional workers into the flow Configure the flow on the fly for custom needs Elastic scaling of the resources used (micro services)

#### OPEN ANALYSIS PLATFORM OVERVIEW

Open Analysis Platform 1/2 Sample intake/feeds Patterns/Signatures/Updates Open Analysis Platform 2/2 Sample Workflow (Elastic MA) Analyst UI Detection Backend

Malware Analysis Telemetry File Reputation Update Information Data Sinks VxDB Global Intelligence Network Analysts ;)

### SAMPLE WORKFLOW CURRENT STATUS

Activation of FRS, Static and Sandbox Emulation workers Automated filtering during all stages of SWF Automated scaling of services using Elastic Load Balancer Pattern creation, distribution and signature generation

#### SAMPLE WORKFLOW CHALLENGES

#### Building on top of young services in the AWS stack

A lot of groundwork before the first deployment

Good insight and scalable logging is still a challenge

### SAMPLE WORKFLOW AWS SERVICES

Storage: S3 Databases: Aurora, DynamoDB Computation: EC2/ECS+ECR Networking: VPC, Route 53 Application Service: SQS, ELB/ALB SAMPLE WORKFLOW NUMBERS

> 600k files per day in 12 Elastic MA instances Python 92.2% Makefile 6.3% Shell 1.5% ~ 5000 Lines of active Code ~ 2 Full Time Employees Multiple deployments per week



## DANKE!

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