

## THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS

& OUTBIDDING CYBERCRIMIMALS

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
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## Throughout history, new technologies have revolutionized crime and warfare alike


- Chariot ...
- Gunpowder
- Tanks ...



Criminals proofed repeatedly to be very fast adopters of new technology




### Thriving Underground Market



## information about security vulnerabilities has become a valuable asset



### Two decades of security investment ...




The top ten vendors *Cisco, IBM, Oracle, Microsoft, Apple, RedHat, Google, Mozilla, Linux, HP* account for more than 44 percent of all vulnerabilities published in the last 12 months.



### Long term trend

Five year average vs. last year



Data source: http://www.techzoom.net/BugBounty/SecureSoftware



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Five year average vs. last year





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# Vulnerabilities known only to privileged closed groups such as ..

Cyber Criminals

**Brokers** 


Government Agencies

.. pose a real and present risk to all who use the affected software






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## Lifecycle of a Vulnerability



#### The

## Known Unknowns

vulnerabilities known to privileged groups only

How many?

Unknown for how long?

How to measure?



## Vulnerability Purchase Programs

Data of two vulnerability purchase programs covering 1,855 vulnerabilities from 2002 - 2013 allow the reconstruction of the vulnerability lifecycle after publication

Program	Program	Total	Targeted	Time To	
	Inception	Purchases	Vendors	Disclosure	Pre-disclosure
iDefense VCP	2002	969	195	133 days	risk
TippingPoint ZDI	2005	1,423	92	174 days	

These programs coordinate vulnerability information with the software vendor!



iDefense Vulnerability Contributor Program (VCP)



TippingPoint Zero Day Initiative (ZDI)



## Relevant targets, considerable exposure

	Vendor	Total Purchases		Days	Vendor		
#	Affected	VCP	ZDI	VCP+ZDI	Private	Share	
1	Microsoft	153	237	390	181	14%	
2	Apple	38	171	209	129	10%	
3	HP	17	157	174	233	19%	
4	Adobe	59	102	161	119	17%	
5	Oracle	29	114	143	166	8%	
6	Novell	30	112	142	142	10%	
7	IBM	58	67	125	226	8%	
8	RealNetworks	19	73	92	262	49%	
9	Sun	34	26	60	159	5%	
10	Symantec	20	39	59	198	18%	
11	Mozilla	8	51	59	80	5%	
12	CA	23	30	53	151	29%	
13	EMC	11	35	46	131	38%	
14	Cisco	10	20	30	229	2%	
15	WebKit	13	14	27	138	5%	
16	Trend Micro	15	10	25	94	24%	
17	Samba	9	14	23	65	28%	
18	Ipswitch	15	8	23	58	25%	
19	SAP	4	10	14	143	13%	
Total		565	1290	1855			-
Average					153	17%	_

#### 14%

of all Microsoft vulnerabilities reported through a purchase program

#### 153 days

from purchase to patch availability



### Purchase programs ...

- cover a considerable share of a vendors' vulnerabilities
- despite offering low prices compared to the "black market"

#### Exposure to "Known Unknowns"


How many yet unpublished vulnerabilities are known to purchase programs exclusively ..

at any given day in the last years?



vulnerabilities known only to VCP and ZDI on any given day between 2010 and 2013

of which target Microsoft, Apple, Oracle, and Adobe





## VCP & ZDI inform the vendor in order to release a patch

average exposure time: 153 days

Critical vulnerabilities are available in considerable quantities for private groups, for extended periods and for a relatively <u>low price</u>



When the vendor is not informed about new vulnerabilities

average 0-day attack persists 312 days



#### More Unknowns

## Our measurement provides a **minimum estimate** of the known unknowns

(... criminals and government agencies don't share data)

What about vulnerabilities and exploits that are not publicly traded, and are definitively not coordinated with the software vendor?

- Boutique Exploit Providers
- Governments & Defense Contractors
- Commercial Security Consulting












## Vulnerability & Exploit Providers

An increasing number of commercial players offer zero-day exploits for their subscribers:

- they do not reveal their clients
   (big buyers reportedly include government agencies)
- have a keen interest in a long pre-disclosure time (keep the zero-day private as long as possible)
- some firms restrict their clientele (by country, specific agencies)
- price for exploits between USD \$40k and \$160k



## **Shopping List**





#### Software Vulnerability Packages

- Development of general and custom tools for IA and IO
- Productization for use by trained and untrained operators

.. for use by trained and untrained operators



## Challenge to Society

Our security depends largely on ethical researchers reporting vulnerabilities under the practices of coordinated disclosure for free

At the same time, the black market is expanding rapidly and offering large rewards for the same information



"Never was so much owed by so many to so few."

Winston Churchill's famous 1940 wartime speech



## Cyber Crime Losses

Yearly losses due to cyber crime are estimated between

10 to 400 billion USD

Vulnerabilities are the root cause of considerable part of these losses



#### What if ...

.. we would purchase all vulnerabilities and report them to the vendor for remediation?

for USD


150,000.per vulnerability?

Online Cost Calculator http://www.techzoom.net/BugBounty/EconomicsGlobal



#### We can outbid criminals

Buying vulnerabilities makes sense as long as the purchase cost is less than the cost of the prevented losses



Vulnerability abuse incurs large collateral damage, exceeding criminals revenue



### International Vulnerability Purchase Program

## What would it cost society to buy all vulnerabilities from all vendors for USD 150,000 each?

This includes buying all non-critical vulnerabilites

#### Cost of buying all vulnerabilities in 2012

		Cost in Million \$			Percentage Cost of			Percentage Cost of		
	Vuln.	Cost by Risk			GDP	GDP	Revenue	Cyber Crin	ne Estimates	
Vendors	Total	High	Med	Low	Total	US	EU	SW Ind.	10 Billion	100 Billion
All	5,218	265	441	76	783	0.005%	0.005%	0.268%	7.827%	0.783%
Top 100	3,332	192	257	51	500	0.003%	0.003%	0.171%	4.998%	0.500%
Top 50	2,959	176	224	44	404	0.003%	0.003%	0.152%	4.439%	0.444%
Top 10	2,065	147	134	29	310	0.002%	0.002%	0.106%	3.098%	0.310%

less than

0.01%

of the **GDP** of the **US** or the **European Union** 

less than

1%

of the yearly cost of **cyber crime** 



### Software vendors buying their vulnerabilities

## What would it cost software vendors to buy all their vulnerabilities for USD 150,000 each?

This includes buying all non-critical vulnerabilites

#### Cost of buying vendor vulnerabilities in 2012

		Cost in Million \$				Revenue in Million \$		
	Vuln.	Cost by Risk						
Vendor	Total	High	Med	Low	Total	Revenue	Cost in %	
Oracle	427	9.8	37.4	17.0	64.1	37,120	0.173%	
Apple	303	25.1	18.3	2.1	45.5	164,700	0.028%	
Google	279	24.9	16.2	0.8	41.9	49,770	0.084%	
Mozilla	202	18.0	11.6	0.8	30.3	n/a		
IBM	175	6.9	16.5	2.9	26.3	104,500	0.025%	
Microsoft	173	18.2	7.2	0.6	26.0	72,930	0.036%	
Cisco	160	13.8	9.5	0.8	24.0	46,680	0.051%	
Adobe	146	19.8	2.1	0.0	21.9	4,404	0.497%	
Linux	116	3.5	10.5	3.5	17.4	n/a		
НР	84	6.8	5.0	0.9	12.6	120,400	0.010%	

less than 1%

of the software vendors' **revenue** 

Total w/o Mozilla, Linux (Open Source, No Revenue)	262.1	600,504.0	0.044%
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## Follow the money ...

The experience of past decades has shown that traditional approaches based on "more of the same" can not deliver adequate security

#### The question to ask is this:

"How much are those that bear the costs willing to pay to reduce their losses incurred as a result of cyber crime?"

# Conclusion Recommendations



#### Conclusion

The software industry is yet unable to produce secure code.

Vulnerabilities and exploits continue to be available for abuse, for extended periods and unknown to the public.



#### Conclusion

We depend on researchers following coordinated disclosure for free, while the black market offers top money, this current approach is not sustainable

It makes economic sense to purchase vulnerabilities, and we can outbid cyber criminals



#### Conclusion

What is the cost of doing nothing?



## REFERENCES





#### References

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