



Your world. Our domain.

DNSSEC for .nl Background, development, lessons learned

Michiel Henneke |Cologne

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- 1. About SIDN
- 2. DNSSEC for .nl
- 3. Adoption strategy for signing
- 4. Results
- 5. Validating
- 6. Lessons learned





- 5.8 million domain names, 3.2 million DNSSEC signed
- Independent private non-profit foundation
- Responsible for the .nl zone since 1996
- Approx 100 employees (+50 Connectis)
- 1,350 registrars
- Turnover 2016 approx €19 million
- Based in Arnhem





SIDN Fund

Created to:

- increase value of the internet for Dutch economy and society
- increase added value of SIDN




In short:


- Independent organisation
- Gives financial support to internet-related projects
 - Education, research and innovation
- Promotion of security and confidence
- Increasing the internet's scope and use



















Market share

Market share websites

Market share overall



Our mission

"Connecting people and organisations in a secure digital world."





.NL and DNSSEC: a history

2001 - 2004	DNSSEC Testbed
2005	DNSSEC part of nameserver policy
2009	Resource support for OpenDNSSEC
2009	DNSSEC.nl platform founded
2010	Friends and Fans Program
2010	Tier 1 for .nl
2012	DNSSEC Tier 2 online
2012	1 million .nl Domain Names Signed
2014	2 million .nl Domain Names Signed
2018	3 million .nl Domain Names Signed



Why do we DNSSEC?

- We hold a central position in the Dutch DNS and there's a lot of expertise in The Netherlands (NlNetLabs, PowerDNS).
- Abuse through DNS is likely to reflect negatively on our reputation.
- It is our interest for DNSSEC to be deployed before this occurs.
- It also enables development of other standards in the Market (DANE).
- But: where does the role of the registry end?



DNSSEC adoption = bootstrapping issue

DNSSEC only functions if ISP's validate keys

ISP's will only do this if a significant part of the zone is signed.

But: why sign your domain name if nobody validates?



Three choices:

- 1. Principal target group:
 - Registrars?
 - ISP's?
 - Registrants?
- 2. Solution to the bootstrapping issue?
 - Awareness
 - Subsidize/offer incentive
 - Create showcases (e.g. signing of big banking sites)
 - Legislation (e.g. government makes DNSSEC mandatory



It started with awareness





But then...

- We found out that large registrars looking for ways to distinguish themselves were interested in DNSSEC.
- .SE reported good results with their incentive for registrars
- Initial investment for registrars biggest impediment.
- New strategy: promote mass signing among a few registrars who are also DNS Operators, to entice the others



The incentive

- \bigcirc 0,20 per signed name per year, paid every quarter
- Deduction for signing errors to encourage high quality.




Show them the money..

? ? **DNSSEC** validation errors **DNSSEC signed domain names** DNSSEC on 07 April 2019 (update per week) on 07 April 2019 (update per week) An incentive is paid for each domain name in your portfolio that is signed with DNSSEC. Domain names that generate validation errors do not qualify. For validation error details, see the DNS Error Report. Want to know more? • See Supporting information and conditions. · See DNS Error Report* for details. • The incentive runs at least until 30 June 2019 0% 2% 100% 0.00% 20.00% Reward forecast Maximum score 60 289 57 0 with DNSSEC with DNSSEC total validation errors domain names Reward forecast What your next six-monthly reward payment will be, in ? euros, if your performance stays the same. We pay DNSSEC validation errors duration out amounts exceeding € 10. on 07 April 2019 (update per week) € 0.00 Active use (status quo) € 4.50 Active use (growth) € 7.30 IPv6 DNSSEC € 6.00 StartTLS € 0.14 No validation errors are found to display. DMARC € 4.00 Total (indicated value) € 21.94

SD

What we thought would happen



S D

Execution:

External factors


- 1. Flawless release of Tier 2
- 2. Dutch Government placed DNSSEC on comply-or-explain list
- 3. PowerDNS starts supporting DNSSEC

Actions taken:

- 1. Close support prevented technical problems.
- 2. Availability of tools and information in Dutch.
- 3. Introduction of validation monitor



What happened




	Account	DNSSECsigned	%signed
1	Registrar #1	403.171	89,1%
2	Registrar #3	350.170	97,8%
3	Registrar #2	317.392	76,6%
4	Registrar #5	84.951	41,4%
5	Registrar #17	56.234	95,0%
6	Registrar #16	41.405	65,6%
7	Registrar #37	21.287	99,5%
8	Registrar #40	20.397	99,8%
9	Registrar #59	14.024	97,8%
10	Registrar #54	11.534	71,9%



SIDN: banken scoren nog steeds slecht op dnssec-beveiliging

Volgens de SIDN is het slecht gesteld met de dnssec-beveiliging van Nederlandse domeinnamen. Vooral de bankensector zou slecht scoren met de invoering van de beveiliging, die onder andere moet voorkomen dat gebruikers naar valse ip-adressen doorgesluisd worden.

In de afgelopen jaren heeft de SIDN zich ingezet om de beveiliging van domeinnaaminformatie met digitale handtekeningen zo breed mogelijk ingevoerd te krijgen, onder andere met een *incentive*regeling die de registrars een korting geeft op ondertekende domeinnamen. Dat had tot gevolg dat inmiddels 46 procent van de 5.701.008 .nl-domeinen met <u>dnssec</u> beschermd is, maar de grote groei is er wel uit. Grote invoeringsprojecten van providers zijn er in de afgelopen twee jaar niet meer geweest.




Bij een recente inventarisatie onder zevenduizend domeinnamen heeft de stichting de invoering per sector onder de loep genomen. De inventarisatie is als pdf <u>beschikbaar</u>. Daaruit blijkt dat vooral bij banken de invoering nog erg laag is: slechts 4 van de 64 domeinen zijn ondertekend. De stichting noemt dit zorgelijk. Ook bij de internet- en telecomsector valt er nog een wereld te winnen: van de 79 domeinen van internetproviders ondersteunen 17 dnssec. Mobiele aanbieders en de ondernemingen die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de datatransportbackbone, scoren volgens de SIDN ronduit slecht.

Roelof Meijer, algemeen directeur SIDN, <u>wijst</u> erop dat het de tweede keer op rij is dat banken het slechtst scoren, terwijl die het meest te maken hebben met *spoofing* en phishing. Overheden hebben een flinke inhaalslag gemaakt, want in 2014 was nog 14 procent van de overheidssites beveiligd maar inmiddels is dat 59 procent.










Financiële dienstverleners

It's more than the number..

omeinnaam	IPv6	%	DNSSEC	%	DKIM
	[score: 0 t/m 5]	80%	ja	100%	nvt/ja
to Id Optine (riiksbuisstiil.nl)	4	80%	ja	100%	ja/ja
Platform Rijksoverheid Online (rijkshuisstijl.nl)	4	THE OWNER WHEN PARTY NAMED		100%	deels/
digid.nl	4	80%	ja	100%	nvt/ne
rijksoverheid.nl	4	80%	ja	And in case of the local division of the loc	nee/ji
njksoverneid.ni Platform Rijksoverheid Online (defensie.nl)	4	80%	nee	0%6	
cbs.nl	0	0%	ja	100%	nee/ne
Tridion Blueprint Platform (bijv. cjib.nl)	2.5	50%	nee	0%	nee/j
rivm.nl	0	0%	nee	0%	ja/ja
belastingdienst.nl	1.5	30%	nee	0%	nee/ja
kvk.nl	and a second	0%	nee	0%	nee/ji
overheid.nl	0	And in case of the local division of the loc		And in case of the local division of the loc	the second s
crisis.nl	2	40%	a	100%	nee/ne
uwv.nl	0	0%	nee	0%	nee/ja
antwoordvoorbedrijven.nl	0	0%	nee	0%	nee/ji
ondernemersplein.nl	1,5	30%	nee	0%	nee/ne
knmi.nl	5	100%	nee	0%	nee/ne
rechtspraak.nl	0	0%	nee	0%	nee/ne
duo.nl	2	40%	nee	0%	nee/ne
vananaarbeter.nl	0	0%			
werkenbijdefensie.nl	0	Name and Address of the Owner, where the	nee	0%	nee/ne
politie.nl	0	0%	nee	0%	nee/ne
svb.nl	the second se	0%	nee	0%	nee/ne
rijkswaterstaat.nl	0	0%	nee	0%	nee/ne
rdw.nl	0	0%6	nee	0%	nee/ne
Dictu Platform (bijv. consuwijzer.nl)	0	0%	nee	0%	
PostenWeb Platform (bity, frankrijk alaasha	0	0%	nee	0%	nee/ja
	0	0%	nee	STREET, STREET	nee/ne
ijschoolgegevens.nl	2	4096		0%	nee/ne
sherlevel.nl	2	409/	nee	0%	nee/ne
	0	40%	nee	0%6	nee/n/
	V V	0%	nee	0%	ne











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Website test: cbs.nl 🛛 💿	Test another website 🛛 😂
	Your domain name:
97%	www.example.nl
	www.oxumpio.ni
Reachable via modern internet address (IPv6)	Start test
<u>Domain name signed (DNSSEC)</u>	
8 <u>Connection <i>not</i> or insufficiently secured (HTTPS)</u>	
One or more recommended application security options not set (Security options)	Directly test:
	www.cbs.nl
<i>i</i> Explanation of test report	
Permalink test result (2019-04-10 14:00 CEST)	
• Seconds until retest option: 194	Test another email 🛛 🖾
	Your email address:
S IPv6	@ example.nl
Well done! Your website is reachable for visitors using a modern internet address (<u>IPv6</u>),	
making it fully part of the modern Internet.	Start test
Oh avu data ila	
Show details	
Name servers	Directly test:
	<u>@cbs.nl</u>
♦ IPv6 addresses for name servers	
✓ IPv6 reachability of name servers	Test your connection



What proved more difficult

Getting registrars with resellers or without central DNS on board.

Software Platforms in the industry reluctant to accommodate DNSSEC for The Netherlands.


Validation...



Validation..

Validation proved much more difficult:


- Telco's fear support calls when user encounters errors
- Infractructure ISP often outsourced (e.g. Huawei)
- Two major players looking at each other
- Telco's too big to care about our incentives





The 2016 Ziggo Case

Google



Ongeveer 407.000 resultaten (0,34 seconden)

Ziggo verwacht nieuwe storingen: zo voorkom je dat jij er last van krijgt ...

https://www.duic.nl/.../ziggo-verwacht-nieuwe-storingen-zo-voorkom-je-dat-jij-er-last... **v** 20 aug. 2015 - **Ziggo** heeft vanochtend aangekondigd meer **storingen** te ... Een wijziging in je **DNS**instellingen is al voldoende om online te kunnen blijven.

Ziggo kampt met dns-storing - update 4 - IT Pro - Nieuws - Tweakers https://tweakers.net/nieuws/104832/ziggo-kampt-met-dns-storing.html •

18 aug. 2015 - Klanten die alternatieve **dns**-servers instellen, melden namelijk geen problemen te ... **Ziggo** heeft een e-**mailstoring** Nieuws van 2 februari **2016**.

Ziggo lost tweede storing op door ddos-aanval op dns af te weren ... https://tweakers.net/.../ziggo-lost-tweede-storing-op-door-ddos-aanval-op-dns-af-te-w... •

20 aug. 2015 - **Ziggo** De 1,8 miljoen klanten die last hadden van de **dns-storing** kunnen ... in de omgeving van Nijmegen Nieuws van 29 november **2016**.

Ziggo storing oplossen: DNS server aanpassen - PcInside Nederland https://www.pcinside.info > Tips > Netwerk ▼

19 aug. 2015 - **Ziggo** kampt vandaag met een flinke **storing**. Het probleem is gelukkig aan uw kant op te lossen door een aanpassing in de **DNS** instellingen.



Lessons learned

- An incentive can be very effective for encouraging signing if the timing and market conditions create fertile ground for it.
- It's one side of the coin: you still need to tackle individual inductries, the ISP's. Their situation is a lot more complicated.
- You can't sell standards individually or base your arguments on a specific issue (Kaminsky). You need to wrap it in a package.
- Therefore DNSSEC was a great way to test our approach to other standards (IPv6)



Are there any questions?



.NL Registrar? Come to our BBQ, 4th of July



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Thank you for your attention!

